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ABSTRACT 
 While most economists agree that the world is facing the worst economic crisis since the 
Great Depression, there is little agreement as to what caused it. Some have argued that 
the financial instability we are witnessing is due to irrational exuberance of market 
participants, fraud, greed, too much regulation, et cetera. However, some Post Keynesian 
economists following Hyman P. Minsky have argued that this is a systemic problem, a 
result of internal market processes that allowed fragility to build over time. In this paper 
we focus on the shift to the “shadow banking system” and the creation of what  Minsky 
called the money manager phase of capitalism. In this system, rapid growth of leverage 
and financial layering allowed the financial sector to claim an ever-rising proportion of 
national income—what is sometimes called “financialization”—as the financial system 
evolved from hedge to speculative and, finally, to a Ponzi scheme.   
The policy response to the financial crisis in the United States and elsewhere has 
largely been an attempt to rescue money manager capitalism. Moreover, in the case of the 
United States. the bailout policy has contributed to further concentration of the financial 
sector, increasing dangers. We believe that the policies directed at saving the system are 
doomed to fail—and that alternative policies should be adopted. The effective solution 
should come in the way of downsizing the financial sector by two-thirds or more, and 
effecting fundamental modifications.  
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There is little doubt that the current crisis is the worst since the Great Depression. 
Proffered explanations regarding the causes include: irrational exuberance, perverse 
incentives, greedy bankers, and misguided policy. Some economists who follow Minsky, 
however, have argued that the current crisis resulted from the fundamental flaws of 
capitalism, and particularly of what Minsky called money manager capitalism (Wray 
2009). It was not unexpected, and came as a “shock” only to the “true believers” of free 
markets, like Alan Greenspan and economists of the Chicago persuasion. As Minsky 
warned, stability is destabilizing and it is not surprising that in the context of deregulation 
and de-supervision starting in 1970s the financial system had become prone to repetitive 
crises that became more frequent, severe, and longer-lasting.  
  This paper sheds light on the changes that have occurred in the U.S. financial 
system over the postwar period as it came to take an ever larger share of income flows. 
Similar transformations have been made in the global financial system, but here we will 
focus on the U.S. An examination of the shift of the relative weights of various types of 
financial institutions as well as other developments in the financial sector shows how the 
whole system evolved toward fragility. Increased concentration in the banking sector has 
created a few large “too big to fail” institutions said to be of “systemic importance”—
institutions we would prefer to designate as “too big to save” because they are 
“systemically dangerous.” This problem is exacerbated after each crisis as institutions 
that survive the crises become bigger and more powerful.  
  Meanwhile, even though large portions of managed money have been wiped out 
during the crisis, it is obvious that it has made a comeback and is looking for another 
bubble. And policy is actually pursuing a strategy of increasing the size and importance 
of the most dangerous institutions. The response in Washington has been to save these 
dangerous institutions and then to propose creation of a “systemic regulator.” We believe 
the mega-institutions are too complex and too politically powerful to effectively regulate. 
Hence, we propose downsizing institutions as well as the financial system as a whole. 
Despite its recent anti-Wall Street rhetoric, the Obama administration has failed to bring 
any significant changes to the way finance operates. Even Obama’s timid proposals, such 4 
 
as taxing banks that received bail-out money, are facing major resistance from the 
financiers, and are unlikely to pass. As memories of the crisis fade away, the momentum 
for real change has been lost. Indeed, the policy response to date has sown the seeds for 
another crisis. We do not have the space to delineate specific alternatives, but argue that 
downsizing finance is a prerequisite to achieving any success at restoring stability to the 
financial system.  
 
FINANCIALIZATION OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
Minsky adopted a stages approach to the evolution of the financial system, calling the 
current phase Money Manager Capitalism, characterized by “highly levered profit-
seeking organizations” such as money market mutual funds, mutual funds, sovereign 
wealth funds, and private pension funds (Minsky 2008 [1986]). A number of structural 
changes have contributed to creating a fragile financial system. The ultimate outcome is 
repetitive bubbles, which turn into financial crises after blowing up. With government 
bail-outs to save financial institutions, after each crisis the financial sector “recovers” 
first, leaving long lasting impacts on the real economy in terms of lost output and 
prolonged unemployment—setting the stage for the next collapse. While the typical 
recession since the early 1970s has been relatively shallow, recovery has taken a long 
time as job creation is slow to resume.  
  Minsky rightly argued that relatively robust performance of the economy 
immediately after the post-war period was not due to the private sector becoming more 
stable, rather, it was the outcome of effective institutional constraints in the form of 
regulation, and creation of the Big Government and Big Bank. Another factor conducive 
to stability was that most debts had been wiped out during the depression leaving the 
private sector with little debt, simplifying balance sheets in Minsky’s terms. Additionally, 
a large government deficit gave households and firms a safe financial asset in the form of 
government debt that was leveraged to produce robust growth (Wray 2009). Over time, 
the ratio of government debt to GDP fell, while the private debt ratios grew.  
  Meanwhile, the New Deal Reforms ensured the financial sector’s share of the 
economy remained fairly limited: it only performed a supporting role for the productive 5 
 
sector. A number of rules helped to restrict concentration in the financial sector and 
forestalled the emergence of large institutions of “systemic importance”—especially the 
Glass-Steagall Act that separated commercial banks from investment banks ensuring a 
guaranteed profit for the former, as well as interstate banking rules that helped to limit the 
size of institutions and made regulating them easier. Thus, the immediate post war period 
experienced long expansion with mild recessions but no financial crises. But stability is 
destabilizing, and this long period of robust growth created the necessary conditions for 
financial crises to return. Financial innovations circumventing regulation eroded New 
Deal regulations, and the system gradually transitioned to fragility making another debt 
deflation possible.  
  Over time, we saw an increasing role for the financial sector, the so-called 
financialization of the economy. Unlike the early postwar period where finance played a 
peripheral role, largely supporting the industrial sector, in most developed countries it 
now dictated the rules of the game. Krippner defines financialization as a “pattern of 
accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than 
through trade and commodity production” (Krippner 2005). Indeed, the distinction 
between “finance” and “industry” disappeared as major manufacturers such as General 
Electric and General Motors constructed financial arms that were (at times) far more 
profitable than their manufacturing business. This made the real economy vulnerable to 
the instability in the financial sector—since a financial crisis would threaten even 
manufacturers with bankruptcy. 
  Figure 1 shows how the financial sector’s share of corporate profits rose rapidly 
(especially since the 1970s) while its contribution to gross value added has remained 
relatively stable. In recent years, while the financial sector contributed just 20 percent to 
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The graph below depicts the financial sector’s outstanding debt. From the mid 1970s debt 
has been growing rapidly—much more rapidly than GDP or the income flows necessary 
to service the debt. This indicates that “leverage” or “layering” for the whole system has 
increased. Without the Big Bank and Big Government the graph would look very 
different: during each crisis the level of outstanding debt would decrease due to defaults. 
That was exactly what happened over the course of the 1930s—so that the economy 
emerged from the depression with almost no private sector debt. But without a large-scale 
debt deflation, the financial sector has been allowed to expand outstanding debt to 120 


























































































































Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts
 
 
Hence, without a depression to wipe out debt, it continued to grow on trend. That is why 
the financial sector was able to capture an ever-rising share of profits. Not only did this 
hinder “real production” as firms and households had to devote larger portions of income 
to debt service, but also it focused capitalist attention on the financial sector rather than 
the “real” sector because it appeared to be more profitable. 
 
CONCENTRATION AND SHIFT TO THE SHADOW FINANCIAL SECTOR  
 
The regulatory framework’s dismantling since the 1970s boosted growing concentration 
in the financial system. U.S. financial institutions grew in part because of the elimination 
of niche banking, allowing big banks to engage in a larger variety of financial activities. 
With globalization and the rise of securitization, many large domestic institutions became 
active participants in global financial markets thus growing even bigger. Each sector 
came to be dominated by a few large institutions with each institution being so large as to 
be able to bring down the whole system if it failed. By 2007 the top 4 banks accounted 
for over 40 percent of bank assets.  
  Another major transformation was the shift of the weight of the financial system 
away from banks and toward “markets” or what Minsky called managed money. 
Commercial banks and saving institutions have become a much smaller share of the 
financial sector as seen from the relative shrinking of their assets. In 2007, institutional 8 
 
investors held about $24 trillion, or 38 percent of total financial assets of the financial 
sector, compared to $12 trillion, or 19 percent, held by banks (Flow of Funds Accounts). 
The rise of money managers has been accompanied by concentration of assets in each 
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  The graph below shows financial sector total credit market debt outstanding. 
Credit market debt owed by commercial banks, finance companies and savings 
institutions has decreased while borrowing by issuers of ABS, Agency and GSE backed 
mortgage pools as well as funding corporations has grown. A remarkable change is the 
increase of credit market borrowing by ABS issuers: from nothing in 1984 to more than 
20 percent of total credit market borrowing in 2008. Issuers of ABS are Special Purpose 
Vehicles established to hold assets and issue debt obligations backed by those assets. 
These are not actual institutions but rather entities created for bookkeeping purposes 
(Guide to Flow of Funds Accounts). Banks set up ABS issuers to move securitized assets 
from their balance sheets to that of the former. These Special Purpose Vehicles then issue 
bonds and commercial paper which are backed by the assets in the pool. This allows 
regulated banks to avoid capital and reserve requirements—increasing leverage and 
return on equity. 9 
 
 
Figure 4  
Credit Market Debt owed by Financial Institutions % of Total 
































































THE BANKING SECTOR 
 
Following his dissertation advisor, Schumpeter, Minsky argued that banks are central to 
the operation of a capitalist economy and that the assets and liabilities of banks largely 
determine the financial framework of the economy (Minsky 2008 [1986], p. 354). The 
fragility of the financial structure is based on the quality of loans made by bankers. If 
bankers finance risky operations, they become fragile. Before the invention of 
securitization, banks were interested in granting loans only to creditworthy customers. As 
Minsky argued, a successful loan officer was considered to be “a partner of a borrower” 
(Minsky 2008 [1986], pp. 260-261). Financial innovations such as securitization and 
Credit Default Swaps, however, have separated risk from responsibility, contributing to a 
deterioration of loan quality and hence greater fragility. Deregulation allowed banks to 
engage in all sorts of risky activities many of which are incompatible with the role banks 
are supposed to play. Many of the larger banks have changed so much that it is unclear 
whether they can be called banks—since they did little underwriting, and tried to shift 10 
 
risks off balance sheets—either by packaging and selling assets or by purchasing 
“insurance” in the form of CDSs. 
  As shown in the graph below, the number of commercial banks has decreased by 
half to about 7,000 banks in the past two decades not counting the failure of many small 
banks that will come in the months ahead. This is remarkable considering that the number 
of institutions was almost constant at about 14,000 from 1934 to 1985. Of course, this 
reflected two trends: rising concentration but also the shift of importance to “markets” or 




































  Deregulation has contributed to increased banking concentration, largely due to 
the elimination of Glass-Steagall as well as the outcome of the “too big to fail” policy 
response during each crisis. Concentration has made the financial sector more fragile by 
creating a few large institutions that dominate more than half of the sector. The top 18 
banks currently hold about 60 percent of total assets with the top 4 holding about 40 
percent (this is even higher than pre-crisis levels)—compared with only 23 percent of 
total bank assets in 1992. Further, as compared with 1992, these are now “universal 
banks,” permitted to engage in a wide range of financial activities, from commercial 
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Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  
 
 
  The income statement and the balance sheets of commercial banks reveal the 
changes that these institutions have undergone. In particular, noninterest income has 
become a larger share of income—see the next figure. Much of this comes from “off-
balance sheet” activities; according to Mishkin noninterest income from off-balance sheet 
activities of banks increased from 7 percent of total income in 1980 to 44 percent in 



































































































































  The largest U.S. bank holding company is JPMorgan Chase. Unlike the smaller 
banks or banks as a whole, its noninterest income has exceeded interest income. The 
largest chunk of the noninterest income (about a quarter) comes from Trading Account 
gains and fees. The next biggest category is Net Securitization Income and Servicing 
Fees, averaging nearly 15 percent of noninterest income from 2002-2009. Investment 
banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting fees and commissions have averaged 13 
percent. Hence these three categories together have been the source of more than 50 
percent of noninterest income. Indeed, at the peak of the boom, noninterest income was 































































































































Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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  As Minsky argued, if bankers put emphasis on the value of collateral rather than 
expected cash flows, a fragile financial system emerges because loan viability depends on 
expected market value of the assets pledged (Minsky 2008 [1986], p. 261). This is 
precisely what has happened: banks originated mortgages which largely depended on the 
value of the collateral and especially on the bubble to maintain rising prices. Commercial 
and Industrial loans have decreased from 20 percent of total assets to 10 percent on 
average. This indicates that the larger banks aren’t really in the business of making loans 
to businesses. Therefore, the major rationale for bailouts of the biggest banks--that capital 
injections into the larger banks will get credit flowing again to business--is fundamentally 
flawed. Help for small and medium sized banks might lead to more business loans, but 





Top 18 Banks (% of 
Assets)—Source FDIC  1992  2002  2007  2008 
Net Loans and Leases  59.58  54.26  56.40  47.50 
All real Estate Loans 
 
21.39  25.78  30.13  25.00 
 
   Commercial Real Estate 
  4.29  4.09  3.77  3.71 
  
  1-4 family residential 
11.47  18.18  21.89  17.34 
 
Commercial and Industrial 
Loans 
20.67  13.11  11.80  10.91 
 
Table 1.2 
Top 3 Banks (% of 
Assets) –Source FDIC  1992  2002  2007  2008 
Net Loans and Leases 
65.72  49.32  47.37  43.03 
All real Estate Loans 
  23.73  17.16  22.46  22.73 
 
   Commercial Real Estate  3.53  2.00  1.83  1.91 
 
   1-4 family residential  13.48  12.33  17.69  17.22 
 
Commercial and Industrial 




All Other Banks (% of 
Assets) – Source FDIC  1992  2002  2007  2008 
Net Loans and Leases  55.46  61.17  67.79  65.83 
All real Estate Loans 
 
25.79  32.81  40.85  41.78 
 
   Commercial Real Estate 
8.28  11.77  15.35  14.66 
 
   1-4 family residential 
13.75  14.54  13.06  16.05 
 
Commercial and Industrial 
Loans 
13.67  12.62  14.21  12.52 
 
 
These tables show the loan composition of banks. We have divided the banks into 3 
groups: the largest 3, the largest 18, and all remaining banks. Larger banks are quite 
different from smaller banks in terms of the quantity as well as the type of loans. The 
largest 3 banks’ loans and leases have decreased from 65 percent of total assets to about 
43 percent in just over 15 years. Real estate loans have remained relatively stable at 
around 22 percent, however, 1-4 family residential loans (which were the main product 
for securitization) have risen. A very important change is the decrease in commercial and 
industrial loans─from about 22 percent of total assets to 11 percent in the last 15 years. 
The picture is fairly similar for the top 18 banks.  
  Commercial loans are granted with the expectation of future cash flows. 
Residential loans, on the other had, were increasingly made against the value of 
collateral. Reliance on residential mortgages made the banks vulnerable to changing 
conditions in the housing market thus giving rise to fragility.  
  Declining net loans and leases has been accompanied by increasing trading. For 
example, at Chase trading has increased from 2.57 percent of assets in 1992 to about 21 
percent of assets in 2008 and for BOA from 2.43 percent of assets in 1992 to about 11 
percent in 2008. A decrease in loans has also been compensated by holding more 
securities (rising from 5 percent to 17 percent of assets), and particularly asset backed 
securities. At Citibank loans and leases have decreased to about 44 percent from over 64 
percent of assets. Securities peaked at the end of 2006 at over 20 percent of assets and 
trading account assets at over 17 percent of assets in 2007. In sum, these data show that 15 
 
the larger banks are different from traditional banks: for the most part, lending to the 




Two “innovations” played an especially important role in transforming the system 
towards fragility: securitization and credit default swaps; the two developments hand-in-
hand with banks securitizing every type of loan and the CDS issuers “insuring” these 
securities. This was very important in promoting the belief that lack of underwriting was 
not important. Various kinds of insurance, including buy-back guarantees as well as 
CDSs made the securitized mortgages (and other types of loans) appear safe, and thus, 
supported high prices for them. At the peak of the bubble mortgage backed securities 
were about 70 percent of total securities of the large banks and about 50 percent for 
smaller banks. Larger banks securitized from 40 to 60 percent of 1-4 family residential 
loans, selling securities to managed money. AIG and other sellers of CDS were eager to 
“insure” all these risks, enhancing credit.  
  CDSs are marketed as insurance, or a way to hedge against risks and therefore 
distribute it to market participants who are most willing and able to bear it. However, as 
Lewis (2009) nicely explains, CDSs create risk out of thin air, essentially allowing 
holders to make bets on the death of assets, firms or even national governments. CDSs 
were initially used to safeguard investments in company bonds but with the increasing 
levels of securitization any type of debt came to be viewed as insurable by CDSs. Wall 
Street banks also used CDSs to mask the risks they had on their books. By engaging in 
risky activities and meantime “hedging” by buying CDSs banks seemed to remain 
relatively risk free in the eyes of regulators. It could get pretty convoluted because CDSs 
allowed one to make bets on failures of assets, firms, or even nations. Goldman Sachs for 
example declared that it was immune to AIG’s failure because it had hedged against that 
by buying CDSs betting on AIG’s failure (Lewis 2009). In other words, Goldman could 
hold risky securities, purchase “insurance” from AIG on those securities, then make a bet 
that AIG would fail to honor that insurance—and thereby seemingly protect itself from 16 
 
any risk. But for any such bet, there is a counterparty that must make good—and that is 
eventually what brought the whole superstructure to crisis. 
  The data on derivatives is impressive. JPMorgan Chase, for example, held 
derivatives worth 6,072 percent of its assets at the peak of the bubble in 2007. The other 
two giants, Citigroup and Bank of America, although still far behind Chase, had 2,022 
percent and 2,486 percent respectively. Goldman Sachs, the other giant, had an 
astonishing amount of derivatives on its balance sheets: 25,284 percent of assets in 2008 
and 33,823 percent as of June 2009. Citigroup and BOA now have more of this risk on 
their books than before the crisis (FDIC SDI database).  
 
 
Table 2. Notional Value of Derivatives of 3 Largest Banks (% of Assets) 
   
Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
BOA  29%  149%  331%  568%  771%  622%  744%  975%  1214% 
Citi  -  -  -  -  -  -  1017%  930%  1064% 
Chase  -  -  -  -  1769%  2180%  2905%  3240%  4004% 
Year 
2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  June 30, 
2009 
BOA  1588%  2062%  2227%  1655%  1864%  1950%  2022%  2111%  2221% 
Citi  1083%  1235%  1421%  1841%  2177%  2286%  2486%  2399%  2527% 
Chase  3992%  4363%  5529%  4236%  4425%  5186%  6072%  4744%  4562% 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, SDI database 
 
   
The largest chunk of these derivatives is interest rate swaps. It is still unknown how large 
the CDS market is as the derivatives market is mostly unregulated. The graphs below 
depict the level of Credit Derivatives (the notional amounts). FDIC doesn’t break down 
this data any further, hence we can’t know for sure how much of this is CDS. However, 
estimates were that at the peak, CDSs totaled globally $60 to $70 trillion, or perhaps 10% 



























































Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, SDI   
 
Figure 10.3 
























Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, SDI Database
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Figure 10.4 













Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, SDI Database  
 
   
  This is important since small losses on derivative holdings can wipe out bank 
capital. Derivatives are not counted in capital ratios. They allow banks to hedge risks, but 
also to take on risks by betting with derivatives. This allows them to increase leverage 
tremendously. We found out just how important this was when AIG failed. It used bailout 
funds to pay off bad bets made by Wall Street banks, including Goldman, on CDOs. In 
addition, there were apparently $10 billion in bad debts which AIG has so far refused to 
cover. These appear to be pure gambling by its (bank) counterparties. That is, the banks 
placed bets on securities they did not hold. At the time of writing this paper, the 
information is still secret as the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (which handled the 
bailout of AIG) refuses to release the details.  
 
DISPARATE EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
 
There has been a major redistribution of wealth and power in the financial sector as a 
result of the crisis. Wall Street as a whole shrank but not all companies have been 
affected equally by the crisis. The market capitalization of Citigroup, for example, has 
shrunk 62 percent since the peak of the market and it could shrink more since it is still on 
government support. Bank of America’s market value has decreased by 45 percent since 
the peak. It has however, become bigger, in terms of asset size, by acquiring Merrill 
Lynch. JPMorgan Chase has been the largest beneficiary of the crisis, surpassing 
Citigroup and Bank of America as it became the largest bank in the U.S. Its value has 
decreased from the peak of the market but only by about 6 percent, a small decline 19 
 
compared to its peers. To some extent it appears that this result is due to the more 
cautious approach that Morgan took to the new types of assets. Wells Fargo became the 
fourth largest bank in the U.S., in terms of assets, after acquiring Wachovia. It has grown 
over 12 percent from the peak of the market. And note that peak was also the peak of the 
bubble.  
  So far, the government has actually favored consolidation when faced with a 
failing financial institution. By creating mega-institutions, government’s bailout has 
given them immunity for future crises by labeling them “too big to fail” and 
“systemically important” (while it refuses to provide a list naming its favored institutions, 
the list certainly includes the top 20). Determining which institutions will be bailed out 
and which will go under, the government has conducted a major redistribution of wealth 













largest 29  












as of January 
26, 2010* 
Share of 




peak of the 
market (%) 
Market 
capitalization of 29 
largest institutions  1870  100  290  100  867.1  100.0    
Citi Group  236.9  12.7  5.8  2.00  89.7  10.3  -62.1 
Bank of America  233.3  12.5  24  8.28  127.8  14.7  -45.2 
AIG  179.8  9.6  5.7  1.97  3.3  0.4  -98.2 
Chase  161  8.6  59.8  20.62  151.5  17.5  -5.9 
Wells Fargo  124.1  6.6  42.3  14.59  139.8  16.1  12.6 
Goldman Sachs  103.5  5.5  37.3  12.86  77.6  8.9  -25.1 
Morgan Stanley  73.4  3.9  17.7  6.10  37.2  4.3  -49.3 
Fannie Mae  65.2  3.5  2.1  0.72  1.1  0.1  -98.3 
American Express  74  4.0  12.5  4.31  45.4  5.2  -38.6 
Capital One  30.1  1.6  3.4  1.17  15.9  1.8  -47.3 
Bank of NY Mellon  51.2  2.7  20.7  7.14  35.4  4.1  -31.0 
Freddie Mac  41.5  2.2  1.2  0.41  0.8  0.1  -98.1 
Merrill Lynch  64.1  3.4  BofA  --  --  --  -- 
Wachovia  101.7  5.4 
Wells 
Fargo  --  --  --  -- 
Washington 
Mutual  31.3  1.7  Chase  --  --  --  -- 
Lehman Brothers  34.3  1.8  Bankrupt  --  --  --  -- 






When the bubble burst and a global crisis was created, it seemed that there was a general 
consensus for meaningful reform. It was obvious that deregulation, de-supervision, and 
self-regulation had failed and that real change was necessary to prevent the system from 
destroying itself. Additionally, reform was virtually required to attenuate public anger 
over the bailouts. In the eyes of many, the economy has survived the worst and is on a 
path to a recovery. Many economists now argue that it is time for the government to work 
out an exit strategy to downsize its share in the financial sector. Those fearing inflation 
have also argued that the Fed will soon need to start raising interest rates. Many on Wall 
Street, who were very eager to receive government support when their institutions were 21 
 
failing, are now arguing that government intrusions are unacceptable. In fact, despite 
major injections of bailout funds, the government has actually played a negligible role in 
the decision making of those firms it helped. One year after President Obama took over,  
the government hasn’t made any significant progress in reforming Wall Street.  
  There have been few criminal prosecutions of the financial geniuses who 
engineered the crisis. Executive pay is still at all-time highs with Goldman Sachs’ 30,000 
employees expected to get as much as $700,000 each in bonuses (Berenson 2009). On top 
of everything else, large banks still reap government subsidies: the Washington Post 
reports that banks with more than $100 billion in assets are getting a competitive 
advantage by being able to borrow at interest rates 0.34 percentage points lower than 
rates charged to the rest of the industry (that advantage was only 0.08percent in 2007). 
(Cho 2009). Banks have been making record profits with Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, 
Morgan Stanley, and the investment banking division of JPMorgan Chase reporting $22.5 
billion in earnings in the first nine months of 2009.  
  So we do realize that many point to reported profits of the megabanks as 
evidence that the policies have worked, although we are very skeptical of the claim that 
the crisis is over. Above we have argued that these policies have promoted consolidation 
and concentration. Further, they have permitted banks to continue to do what they were 
doing—that is, to engage in risky practices. It is not possible to say with certainty how 
banks have been able to manufacture profits even though they are not making loans, and 
even though they still hold billions of bad, delinquent loans. The reported profits come 
from trading activity. It is relatively easy to manufacture profits on trades of opaque 
assets that do not have real market prices—indeed, that is exactly what led to the crisis. 
We suspect that most of the reported profits result from “quid pro quo” trades—you buy 
my bad assets at inflated prices, I buy yours, and we both book big profits. That is exactly 
what U.S. thrifts did in the 1980s. In any event, the financial sector is again capturing an 
outsized share of corporate profits—which we believe is not a good sign even if the 







Profits of Domestic Financial and Nonfinancial Sectors (% of 





































































































































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis  
 
  We are also doubtful that the U.S. economy is really recovering. First, GDP got 
a big boost from the “cash for clunkers” program in which the U.S. government offered a 
subsidy for new car purchases on the condition that older cars were crushed. Table 4 
shows the boost this added to third quarter 2009 GDP growth: 1.45 percentage points 
while total GDP growth was 2.2 percent. More recently, most economic growth has 
resulted from inventory investment as business refilled shelves. The 5.7 percent GDP 
growth for the fourth quarter of 2009 came from 3.39 percent growth in inventories and 
only 2.34 percent growth in final sales of domestic product. Since the stimulus package 
will have run out by summer 2010, and since no large fiscal package is likely to be 
forthcoming, we doubt that a true recovery will get underway. Finally, when we look at 
the global deflationary pressures that exist—with the lone exception of the “Brics” 




Table 4. Contributions to Percent Change in Real Gross 
Domestic Product by Major Type of Product      
(Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates) 
Gross domestic product   2009-III    2009-IV  
Total GDP Growth  2.2  5.7 
       Final sales of domestic product  1.54  2.34 
            Durable Goods  0.76  -0.01 
            Non-Durable Goods  0.15  1.71 
            Services  0.7  1.14 
            Structures  -0.06  -0.5 
       Change in private inventories  0.69  3.39 
            Durable Goods  0.88  2.07 
            Non-Durable Goods  -0.19  1.32 
Addenda:       
  Motor vehicle output  1.45  0.61 




  Obama warned Wall Street that this is going to be “the most ambitious overhaul 
of the financial system since the Great Depression,” but he is not going to impose real 
change: “Instead, we are calling on the financial industry to join us in a constructive 
effort to update the rules and regulatory structure to meet the challenges of this new 
century... We have sought ideas and input from industry leaders, policy experts, 
academics, consumer advocates, and the broader public,” (Obama 2009) The government 
is looking at Wall Street with naïveté, hoping it will reform itself. However, if something 
can be learned from the crisis it is that we cannot rely on these institutions to self-
regulate. Geithner’s proposed legislation seeks to give the government the ability to take 
over failing giant institutions and to resolve them in an orderly manner to prevent ripple 
effects throughout the system. This proposal is not only not bold enough but is also 
redundant as the government already has the power to take over and resolve large 
institutions like it did in case of the Continental Illinois Bank (Johnson 2009). Hence, the 
regulatory reform proposal of the administration is timid and appears to be aimed at 
saving the system as it is, without any major changes. But even a conservative proposal 
like this is highly unlikely to make it far considering the strong resistance from the 
financial sector and its track record of effectively blocking any change it doesn’t like.  24 
 
  A progressive policy aimed at solving the issue of too big to fail institutions 
would break down every institution that is considered to be “systemically important” into 
smaller functional pieces. Too big to fail institutions shouldn’t be allowed to exist. They 
are too complex and too big to be safely managed and resolved if necessary. Allowing 
such institutions to exist gives too much power, both market and political, to behemoths. 
Instead, the FDIC should be required to determine which large banks are insolvent based 
on current market values. The balance sheets of the top 20 banks should be examined on 
a consolidated basis, with derivative positions netted (data indicates that most derivatives 
are held by the biggest banks, which serve as counterparties for one another). After 
netting positions, the insolvent banks would be resolved following two principles: 
resolution at the least cost to the FDIC and with a view to downsizing institutions. The 
ultimate objective must be to minimize impacts on the rest of the banking system. It will 
be necessary to cover some uninsured losses to other financial institutions as well as to 
equity holders (such as pension funds) arising due to the resolution. (Auerback and Wray 
2009) 
  One option is close regulation of securitized products and establishing a 
centralized clearinghouse for derivative trades is the second major component of the plan. 
Originators of securitized products would have to keep some portion of those assets on 
their books. However, a large part of the disturbances of the early 2008 were due to Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and others doing exactly that (Johnson 2009). This and other 
types of recursive arrangements were the main reason why many institutions went 
insolvent and were near the brink of failure. This proposal is actually rather conservative 
considering the role that mortgage backed securities played in the debacle of the financial 
system. Even today many supporters of securitization defend it as a good tool for 
distributing risks to those who are most willing to bear it. But we have learned during this 
crisis that those who are most willing to bear the risk might not always be able to do so. 
Moreover, distributing risk doesn’t eliminate it from the system—indeed it increases it by 
removing the incentive to underwrite. Without going further into detail on the flaws of 
securitization which have been extensively examined, we argue that securitization should 
be forbidden altogether as an activity that regulated and protected banks would be 
permitted to undertake. By separating risk from responsibility, it creates perverse 25 
 
incentives and helps generate bubbles which will inevitably burst. Auerback argues that 
banks should be required to keep loans on their balance sheets as there is no public 
purpose served by selling loans to third parties. And as we have seen, there can be 
substantial negative consequences (Auerback 2009).  
  Many critics have proposed legislation to deal with the issue of credit default 
swaps, a major factor magnifying the effects of the crisis. For example, a popular 
proposal is to create a regulated exchange for credit default swaps and other financial 
derivatives through which banks and other financial institutions will be required to trade 
these instruments. That would make the market more transparent, and could reduce 
counterparty risk. But even this very conservative policy has received strong resistance 
from the financial sector and going into the third year of the crisis, the derivatives market 
is still largely unregulated. The financial lobby is actively working to water down any 
regulatory tightening on derivatives, a major source of profits and hence bonuses for the 
banks.  
  We think that it would be best to simply forbid regulated and protected banks 
from using credit default swaps—they should bear the risks so that they have an incentive 
to do proper underwriting. Hence we agree with what analysts have rightly argued, that 
banks should be forbidden to buy or sell credit default insurance as they don’t serve any 
public purpose. These are merely a vehicle for the financial sector for redistributing 
wealth and reaping massive profits. CDSs allow the lender to be paid off even when the 
borrower defaults on their asset thus making the bank indifferent to the creditworthiness 
of the borrower. The solution to the CDS problem is to make big banks net out gross 
CDS positions among themselves and then forbid their use of credit default swaps 
altogether. (Auerback and Wray 2009) 
  Perhaps the best part of the proposal put forward by Washington, and the one 
least likely to pass is the creation of a new consumer finance protection agency which 
would protect consumers from deceptive practices and abuse. It would have the power to 
regulate mortgages, credit cards and any other form of consumer debt. As the New York 
Times reports, however, big financial institutions have unified with smaller community 
banks to fight against the creation of this agency. We realize that the Fed would like to 
take over control of this function, but it has demonstrated over the past several decades 26 
 
that it is particularly ill-suited to protect consumers. It is captured by its owners—the 
member commercial banks.  
  Most recently, under the pressure of public anger, Obama proposed a new 
“Volcker Rule” that would prohibit regulated and publicly insured financial institutions 
from operating hedge funds, private equity funds, or engaging in proprietary trading. The 
expectation is that by somewhat limiting the types of activities these institutions can be 
engaged in, their further consolidation will be prevented and they will even shrink. This 
is a step in the right direction but is not nearly enough to make the financial sector safe. 
Any institution that has access to the Fed and to the FDIC should be prohibited from 
making any kind of trades. They should return to their traditional roles of making loans, 
purchasing securities, and then holding them through maturity. Any bank that is unhappy 
with these new conditions can hand back its bank charter and become an unprotected 
financial institution. Those that retain their charters will be treated as public-private 
partnerships, which is what banks are. They put up $5 of their own money, then gamble 
with $95 of government (guaranteed) money. The only public purpose they serve is 
underwriting, and that only works if they hold all the risks. 
  And finally, the solution to the current mess should not bypass the issue of 
fraud. It is rampant in the financial sector and has certainly increased since the crisis. 
(Where do you think all of those record profits come from?) Fraudulent institutions must 
be shut down, investigated and their management jailed.  
  It is obvious that the bailout policies haven’t worked to fix the economy. Trying 
to save the system as it is and even exacerbating the already existing problems along the 
way create the necessary conditions for another massive financial crisis and even a 
depression to occur in the not so remote future. Bank balance sheets haven’t been 
simplified, financial institutions haven’t been restructured, and concentration problems 
haven’t been resolved. The only changes that have taken place have been superficial and 
have contributed to making the system even more fragile. Debts are still at historically 
high levels. The four large banks have derivatives on their balance sheets which are 
thousands of times more than their assets. The fundamental causes of the crisis haven’t 
been addressed; the system today is in a worse shape than it was prior to the crisis. The 27 
 
reforms proposed by the government will not prevent any future crises and they wouldn’t 
have prevented this one if they were in place.  
  The more progressive policies proposed above would help simplify the financial 
system, reduce concentration, and decrease its size relative to the economy, something 
that the administration’s proposal will fail to achieve. We will also need debt relief for 
households. This can include a package of policies that would replace unaffordable 
mortgages with better terms provided by strengthened GSEs. Some underwater 
mortgages should be foreclosed, with homeowners converted to renters with an option to 
repurchase the home later. Tax relief and job creation will help to boost ability to service 
debt, and will help to jumpstart the economy so that firms can stop downsizing. The 
public retirement system will need strengthening and real health care reform is required.  
  The role of managed money must be reduced; this can be encouraged by 
eliminating various subsidies including tax-advantaged saving. In the place of private 
pensions we need to expand and strengthen publicly provided pensions Of course, all of 
this is a movement in the opposite direction to that currently envisioned by the Obama 
administration—which is actually trying to increase the financialization of health care by 
forcing all individuals to purchase health “insurance.” And managed money is looking to 
financialize death (through securitization of “death settlements,” buying up life insurance 
policies of people with terminal illnesses) (Auerback and Wray 2009). Managed money 
is searching for its next bubble which is probably in commodities futures (again) or 
carbon futures trading. Unless it is constrained, another boom and bust is inevitable. 
  Minsky argued that depressions play a useful role for capitalist economies: they 
simplify balance sheets by wiping out financial assets and liabilities. The result is a 
system where hedge units are a majority, which therefore is relatively stable. One reason 
why financial fragility has built up over time in the postwar period was because there 
were no depressions. To be sure, there were financial crises that wiped out a significant 
proportion of debt in the economy, but as Big Government and Big Bank set floors and 
ceilings in the economy, each time the system recovered with still high levels of debt. 
Experience shows that this is not sustainable. While we are not advocating that the 
government allow a 1930s style debt deflation, we argue that for any policy to be 28 
 
effective in the longer run, it needs to involve balance sheet simplification, but without 
depression.  
  The government has all the powers necessary to reregulate Wall Street. New 
Deal reforms were very successful in containing instability for a couple of decades. But 
innovations as well as deregulation rendered these ineffective. Minsky argued that the 
Fed and legislation can guide the evolution of the financial system to constrain instability 
by encouraging institutions and practices that reduce instability and constraining those 
that enhance it. He also argued that if the Fed can intervene to put a floor on the collapse 
it must also take initiative to “prevent the development of practices conducive to financial 
instability” (Minsky 2008 [1986]). The current crisis was a warning sign. The question is: 
will we take this warning seriously and reform the system or do we need another Great 
Depression to finally bring about real change.  
 
“The profit-seeking bankers almost always win their game with the authorities, 
but in winning, the banking community destabilizes the economy the true losers 
are those who are hurt by unemployment and inflation.” (Minsky 2008 [1986], 
 p. 279) 
 
  As long as there are large pools of managed money looking for high returns, the 
question is where the next bubble will develop. The only hope is a substantial downsizing 
of managed money, which will help to reduce the influence of money managers on our 
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